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Africa is the only region of the developing world in which the number of people living below the international poverty line of $1.00 per day has increased in the last twenty-five years. In response, beginning in the early 1990s, changes in donor objectives and behavior placed the poor at the center of development assistance policy in Africa.
Civil society organizations and aid agencies as diverse as Britain's DFID and the Vatican, advocated developing strategies for "pro-poor growth" in Africa. Both bilateral and multilateral development partners increased their focus on reducing income and nonincome poverty, as set out in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), often at the expense of such traditional interests as infrastructure and agriculture. The poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) initiative of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, launched in 1999 reinforced this trend, particularly during its early implementation, by appearing to encourage governments to focus poverty reduction strategies primarily on increases in social expenditures. 2 Recently, some revisionism has begun to creep into the donor dialogue.
Governments in Africa have become more forceful in advocating for economic growth as the centerpiece of their poverty reduction strategies (World Bank, 2004b) . Aid agencies have begun to take a second look at the continent's mounting infrastructure deficit andlagging agricultural productivity, and to ask what role development assistance might play in dealing with these. And the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) has taken up the growth agenda with a focus on governance, infrastructure, and regional integration (Commission for Africa, 2005) .
Within this evolving context, what is the role for pro-poor growth? How should it be defined? And is the concept useful for development policy in Africa? This paper attempts to address these issues. It is organized in six sections. Section I surveys the definitional debate on "pro-poor growth." Section II examines the argument that accelerating the rate of growth in low income countries is sufficient to achieve sustained poverty reduction, and contrasts it with the diversity of regional and country experiences with the long-run relationship between growth and poverty reduction. Section III looks at growth and poverty dynamics in Africa, and concludes that economic growth and growth-oriented policies, while necessary for sustained poverty reduction, do not guarantee that it will occur at the country level. Section IV introduces the concept of a shared growth strategy for Africa, and Section V sets out three policy elements of such a strategy that appear relevant to a large number of African economies. Section VI concludes.
I. What is Pro-Poor Growth?
Simple theory and empirical evidence indicate that poverty reduction can be achieved by accelerating economic growth and/or by changing the distribution of income in favor of the poor. We know that sustained economic growth reduces poverty. This is not to say, however, that average income growth increases the incomes of the poor in every growth episode in every country.
3 Pro-poor growth has been broadly defined by a number of international organizations as growth that leads to significant reductions in poverty (OECD, 2001 and UN, 2000) . In attempting to give analytical and operational content to the concept two operational definitions have emerged.
The first draws on the literal meaning of the phrase: growth is pro-poor when the poor benefit disproportionately from it. This criterion is met if the rate of income growth of the poor exceeds the rate of income growth of the non-poor. Thus, in order for growth to be pro-poor, it must be accompanied by a decrease in inequality. The second definition discards the literal interpretation of the concept for a more general, but very much less strict formulation: growth is pro-poor if it reduces poverty. Using this second definition, average income growth will always result in pro-poor growth except when the incomes of the poor are stagnant or decline. 4 For public policy purposes neither definition of pro-poor growth is fully satisfactory. Both definitions address a common public policy objective --reducing poverty through economic growth--and both suggest that there may be trade-offs between development strategies that are pro-poor and those that are pro-growth. Under the first definition of pro poor growth this tradeoff is explicit: policies that promote growth at the expense of increasing income inequality are not pro-poor. This clearly runs the risk of ignoring overall economic welfare and even the fortunes of the nearly-poor.
Under the second, the distinction between pro-poor and pro-growth policies is less clear cut. Policies to spur growth can result in increases in income inequality and remain pro 3 See for example Ravallion (2001) or Kakwani and Pernia (2000) . 4 For surveys of the definitional debate see Cord, Lopez and Page (2003) and Klasen (2003) .
poor, as long as they continue to raise the incomes of the poor. But, what is a significant reduction in poverty? How much must the poor benefit for growth to be considered propoor? Most advocates of even this weaker formulation of pro-poor growth would add that it is also relevant to inquire how the rate of income growth of the poor stacks up, both relative to historical trends and to the current rate of growth of average income.
II. Is Growth Enough?
An important strand of the literature on growth and poverty reduction side steps the definitional debate. It argues that because on average growth benefits the poor to the same extent it benefits the non-poor, the distinction between growth and pro-poor growth as a public policy objective is not practically relevant. Policies designed to maximize the rate of growth in low income countries are likely also to be those that maximize the growth of income of the poor.
The support for this line of argument rests on three simple empirical propositions.
First, Dollar and Kraay (2002) -among several others --find that that the poor typically share in rising aggregate income, and suffer from economic contractions, in the same proportion as the non-poor. On average growth is good for the poor, or at least as good for the poor as for everybody else. Second, growth has no apparent systematic impact on income distribution. 5 Thus, growth oriented policies are on average unlikely to affect the pro-poorness of the growth process. Third, growth has been elusive. 6 The fact is that most poor countries are not growing. Put bluntly this line of argument reduces to: "put growth at the center of the policy agenda and poverty reduction will follow."
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Foster and Szekely (2000), Deininger and Squire (1996) , and Ravallion and Chen (1997) .
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See Easterly (1999) While it is difficult to argue that sustained poverty reduction can be achieved alongside economic stagnation or decline, the debate over pro-growth versus pro-poor strategies, hinges on the extent to which the average relationship between growth and income distribution conceals important variations that may, ultimately be addressed by public policy.
There is a substantial literature documenting the large variations in the poverty impact of given growth rates across countries. 7 Figure 1a plots the evolution of per capita income and per capita income of the lowest income quintile of the population for all developing countries. 8 The extent to which the poor have benefited from the process of economic growth has varied quite considerably over time. While between 1970 and 1990 income of the poorest 20 percent of the population grew at a similar pace to average income in developing economies (and the 1980's expansion appears to have been accompanied by pro-poor distributional change), the early 1990s saw a fall in per capita income levels of the poor (about 2 percent per year on average) in developing countries.
The second half of the 1990s was characterized by stagnation in the incomes of the lowest quintile in developing countries, despite renewed average income growth.
Underlying the advocacy for pro-poor growth is an assumption that historically the poor have failed to benefit sufficiently -or at all -from the growth experiences of low income 7 Ravallion (2001) for example finds that, based on cross country evidence, the 95% confidence interval for a 1% increase in average household income or consumption yields anything from a modest drop in the poverty rate of 0.6% to a more dramatic 3.5% decline 8
The data underlying Figures 1-3 are drawn from: (i) Dollar and Kraay (2002) . This database contains 418 observations for 133 countries of the income shares by quintile of the population: and (ii) Cord, Lopez and Page (2003) which contains 366 observations on headcount poverty (US$1 (PPP) per day poverty line) for 42 countries, average survey income, and the computed income that would accrue to the lowest quintile of the population.
countries. It is interesting that the global data support this perception in the 1990s but not before. Figures 1b and 1c show the evolution of the same income indices for two developing regions: East Asia and the Pacific and South Asia. Developments in East Asia are to some extent similar to the world wide pattern, with steady growth in both income per capita and income of the lowest quintile, accompanied by rising inequality.
South Asia in contrast shows a strongly pro-poor bias to growth beginning in the 1980s.
Poverty headcount data -which are available only from the mid-1980s -however, indicate that poverty has fallen in East Asia more than in any other region of the developing world. 9 The contrast between East and South Asia illustrates the powerful impact of very rapid income growth on poverty reduction and the practical difficulty of setting more rapid relative growth of increases of the poor in a public policy objective.
While in East Asia the income of the lowest quintile increased in the late 1990s to 300 percent of the 1970 level, the income of the lowest quintile in South Asia increased only to about 225 percent. Thus, despite the deterioration in income distribution after 1990, growth in East Asia yielded the largest income gains to the poor.
Underlying these global and regional trends is even greater diversity of country experience. Cord, Lopez and Page (2003) provide evidence -summarized in Table 1 The great diversity of relationships between average income growth and income growth of the poor makes the case for a strategy for poverty reduction based solely on pro-growth policies less than fully persuasive. Very rapid growth of the type experienced in East Asia was clearly beneficial to the poor --although the case of China where rapid growth was accompanied by a rapid increase in inequality and limited gains for the poor provides a cautionary note --but more modest growth accompanied by increases in inequality of the type experienced primarily in Latin America had little, and in some cases negative, impact on the fortunes of the poor. Moreover, between 1965 and 1995 the high performing Asian economies pursued activist policies to equip the poor to participate in and benefit from growth at the same time that they were pushing the growth agenda, leading to the very close tracking of average incomes and those of the poorest quintile (World Bank, 1993a , 2005a . In countries such as Egypt, Ghana and Tunisia modest growth was accompanied by reductions in inequality and the resulting increase in
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There is no country in the sample where the definition of pro-poor growth requiring absolute income gains of the poor to exceed average absolute income gains is met, and suggests that the definition lackS practical relevance. the income of the poor was sufficient to place them among the global leaders in terms of growth of income of the poor. Although countries experiencing more rapid relative growth of the income of the poor make up only 20 percent of the top quintile of countries ranked by overall per capita income growth, they comprise half of the top quintile ranked by per capita income growth of the poor.
But, neither do the data offer a fully convincing argument for abandoning the growth agenda in search of policies that bias growth in favor of the poor. The sample contains only six cases in which average per capita income growth greater than 1.0 percent has resulted in declines in incomes of the poor, and only three cases (including the striking case of Jordan) in which growth of average income of less than one percent has translated into a rate of growth of income of the bottom quintile of more than one percent via progressive distributional change. Rapid overall growth, accompanied by modest deteriorations in income distribution had a greater impact on the welfare of the poor than growth that was biased in their favor in an overall low growth environment.
In public policy terms, what are we to make of the pro-poor -pro-growth debate?
The cross country evidence offers little support for an a priori choice between growth oriented and poverty oriented strategies. Rather, strategies based on a mix of growth oriented policies and policies intended to ensure that the benefits of growth are widely shared are likely to be most successful in achieving sustained poverty reduction. And, the appropriate mix between the two is likely to vary across countries and over time.
China for example has recently turned increasing attention to reducing spatial income inequalities after two decades of rapid but disequalizing growth. Egypt in contrast has attempted to spur growth while reducing traditional transfer mechanisms and public employment practices intended to promote equity.
Further attempts to define and measure a single concept of pro-poor growth are likely to yield few gains. Indeed they run the risk of diverting attention from the important public policy objective for low income countries -ensuring that the growth income of the poor is sufficient to reduce the incidence of absolute poverty. Economic growth and pro-growth policies are central to this objective, but they are not enough.
Progressive distributional change (or even slowing a trend toward rising income inequality) can have an important impact on the rate of growth of incomes of the poor.
III. Africa's Growth and Poverty Dynamics.
The income and poverty dynamics of Africa illustrate this conclusion well. The data are drawn from the new data set on poverty, income and distribution constructed by Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen for the poverty estimates contained in World Bank (2005).
The African economies represented in Table 1 offer a similar diversity of growth and poverty reduction experiences to those of other low and middle income countries.
Mauritius, Gabon, and Ghana all experienced growth episodes of ten or more years duration in which per capita income rose at annual average rate of more than two percent.
In Gabon and Ghana income growth disproportionately favored the poor, as incomes rose more quickly on average in the lowest quintile of the distribution than for the population as a whole. Mauritius in contrast had a rate of growth of income of the poor that was less than half of its average per capita growth rate. Niger, Sierra Leone and Zambia were characterized by anti poor biased recessions, while in Ethiopia and Senegal extended periods of economic stagnation (average per capita growth of 0.2 percent) saw declining average incomes in the bottom quintile of the income distribution. Figure 6 presents the country specific patterns of income growth for the poor and non poor for four individual countries in the 1990s. The diversity of experience is striking. In Ethiopia for example modest growth since the early 1990s does not appear to have been reflected in the growth of average income of the bottom quintile. In Ghana the fortunes of the poor first improved relative to the non-poor in the early 1990s and then took a sharp downward turn late in the decade. In Uganda the early stages of its post conflict recovery were highly pro-poor biased, but that pattern reversed itself in the second half of the 1990s. Burkina Faso experienced a growing divergence between the poor and the population as a whole throughout a decade of sustained growth.
Africa's experience of the 1990s also appears to offer an exception to the widely held view that income distributions do not change very much over time (Deninger and Squire, 1996; Li, Squire and Zou, 1998) . Figure 7 presents estimates of the gini coefficient for two periods -before 1996 and after 1996 -for 13 African countries.
Interestingly, while the average gini coefficient across the 13 countries does not change between the two periods, this reflects substantial offsetting movements within individual countries, with some moving in the direction of greater income equality and others moving in the opposite direction.
Africa's poverty dynamics offer support to both pro-growth advocates and to the advocates of pro-poor interventions. The continent's long economic decline clearly favored no one, poor and non-poor alike, although the fortunes of the poor on average appear to have deteriorated to a modestly greater extent than those of the non poor.
Individual country experiences of the 1990s -the period for which we have most comprehensive data --offer a diverse set of growth-distribution and poverty reduction outcomes. Clearly, a sharper public policy focus on growth is needed, but the concern that the benefits of growth will not be reflected in improving incomes and welfare of the poor cannot be easily dismissed. "Growth was good for the poor", but not to the same extent all the time, everywhere in Africa. In short pro-poor or pro-growth? Probably both.
IV. Building a Shared Growth Strategy for Africa.
The notion that a development strategy should include both pro-growth and propoor elements is not new.
12 Indeed the controversial World Bank World Development Report, 2000: Attacking Poverty listed creating economic opportunities, together with empowerment and security as key elements of an anti-poverty strategy. In practice, however, the donor community appeared to drift away from these twin objectives in the 1990s, moving in the direction of an almost myopic focus on service delivery in the social sectors as the key public policy objective. Africa's leaders, sensitive to the priorities of their donor communities, responded accordingly.
The upshot of the development community's focus on direct interventions to reduce poverty was a profound shift in the composition of public expenditures in Africa. 
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During the past thirty years the development community has toyed with such expressions of this objective as: "Redistribution with Growth", "Basic Needs", and "Poverty Reduction Strategies". See for example Ahluwhalia and Chenery (1974) .
How might Africa strike a better balance between pro growth and pro poor policies? A crucial insight may come from the highly successful developing economies of East Asia. The development strategies pursued by all of the first generation high performing Asian economies -Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore Taiwan (China), and Thailand -have been characterized as "shared growth strategies".
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These strategies consisted of two components. The political elites fostered growth by encouraging high savings, long term investments, and upgraded organization, technology and management. Growth was at the center of the public policy agenda. But, highly visible wealth sharing mechanisms -such as universal primary education, land reform, and free basic health care --were put in place to induce non-elites to support the growth process. Unlike simple redistributive mechanisms, such as food or fuel subsidies or public employment in non-productive activities, these mechanisms signaled the population that all parties would share in the benefits of growth through increased capacity to participate in and benefit from the process of economic change.
A shared growth strategy for Africa requires, a renewed focus on growth. African governments have led the way in refocusing the development debate on growth; indeed some would argue that they never abandoned the growth objective.
14 But it is important for the donor community to validate the centrality of growth in both policy and money terms. National poverty reduction strategies can identify key constraints to growth and define appropriate policy and donor responses to relieve them. 15 As growth oriented
The term is due to World Bank (1993a). A fuller exposition of the concept is provided in Campos and Root (1996) . Given the pervasive use of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) as donor coordination instruments this can be done by modifying the PRSP.
policies are identified and implemented, however, much greater care needs to be given to understanding the distributional consequences of pro-growth public actions. Reforms have both short and long run consequences (some of them unintended) for various income groups, and too little attention has been given by governments and donors alike to their magnitudes. Finally, effective wealth sharing mechanisms -specific to the country context --must be identified and implemented on a sustained basis. Public investmentsfor example in basic education, health, or infrastructure for market access --can be aimed at groups that are not yet benefiting from the expansion of the economy. Initially, such wealth sharing mechanisms may be funded primarily by donor assistance, but as economic expansion takes place, an increasing share of the burden should be taken up from domestic resources. This is important, not only from the point of view of sustainability, but also as a sign of political commitment by the elites to the shared growth agenda.
Making investments in the poor will demand innovation. Governments need to know which segments of the population benefit from particular programmatic commitments, and which may be excluded. Budget allocations must be aligned with wealth sharing priorities. And, well-harmonized support from donors around these priorities will be indispensable. A good example is the recent Free Primary Education program in Kenya, which placed major responsibility with local communities and the schools themselves. The results are encouraging. Enrollments in public primary schools jumped from 5.9 million in 2002 to 7.2 million in 2004, and a massive increase took place in the availability of textbooks. Equally important from the shared growth perspective is that Kenyan parents see every day that their children have access to improved education. Similarly, in Ethiopia the government's determination to lessen citizens' vulnerability to draught and climate change has led to a water-harvesting program intended to create a meaningful safety net for rural communities.
V. Three Building Blocks for Shared Growth.
Given the Africa's great diversity, shared growth strategies will necessarily need to adapt to local opportunities and constraints. As the East Asian experience has taught, this is an area in which one size emphatically does not fit all. 16 Nevertheless, three policy areas can be identified which merit further research and thought as potential building blocks to construct shared growth strategies in many of the continent's economies. These are (i) managing natural resource revenues; (ii) creating an export push in agriculture and (iii) strengthening sub-regional integration.
Each of these three areas has the potential to contribute to shared growth in different ways. Natural resource revenues accrue primarily to the state, and hence public decision making directly influence s their allocation. Governments of mineral exporting economies can invest in both growth promoting assets, such as infrastructure, and in activities to improve the capacity of the poor to participate in growth, such as education, or -as many mineral exporters inside and outside Africa have done -they can dissipate mineral revenues through consumption and corruption.
Most of Africa's population and the vast majority of its poor live in rural areas.
Where poverty reduction has succeeded in Africa in the 1990s it has been attributable 16 See World Bank (1993a) and Campos and Root (1996) for a presentation of the range of policy instruments employed in the early Asian successes.
primarily to increases in the incomes of rural households (World Bank 2005c).
Beginning in the mid 1990s agricultural export production expanded significantly in Africa, responding to improved macroeconomic stability and structural reforms. But agricultural exports remain a small share of total output in most countries on the continent. An agricultural export push thus has the potential to raise both overall and agricultural growth rates and to increase on and off farm incomes in Africa's rural areas.
Exports -and agricultural exports in particular -are constrained in part by lack of low-cost market access for the large number of landlocked economies in Africa. More than thirty percent of Africa's population lives in landlocked countries in contrast to about 2 percent of the world's population. For these economies effective integration with their coastal neighbors is imperative if the benefits of growth in Africa are to be broadly shared across national boundaries as well as within them.
Managing natural resource revenues
Forty five percent of all African exports come from the oil and mining sectors, and the volume and range of minerals exports has increased substantially during the last decade (Figure 8 ). Sixty-five per cent of all the foreign direct investment in Africa during the 1990s was concentrated in oil, gas and mining. Oil revenues for the region are These are substantial public resources available to African governments.
However, much more attention to the management of revenues from natural resources is needed if their promise of supporting shared growth is to be realized. Ironically, African countries dependent on oil, gas and mining tend to have weaker political institutions, higher rates of poverty and higher inequality than non-mineral dependent economies at similar levels of income. Resource rich countries often lag in overall development, with higher levels of child malnutrition, lower educational outcomes, and shorter life expectancy.
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Yet, natural resource wealth can be an effective driver of shared growth. Chile, which has been the fastest growing Latin American country for the past 15 years has relied almost entirely on exports of natural resource products, accompanied by openness to trade and Foreign Direct Investment.
18 Technological innovation -supported by the resource rich sectors -helped sustained, broad based growth. Indonesia, another important natural resources exporter, successfully pursued a twenty-five year policy of using a share of its petroleum revenues to increase the productivity of small holder agriculture, through targeted fertilizer subsidies and massive investments in rural infrastructure (roads, irrigation, market infrastructure and water systems There is a substantial literature on the political economy of natural resources exporters in Africa to suggest that undertaking these changes will not be trivial.
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Political, social and ethnic factors combine to encourage clientelism in fiscal policies and
Commodity windfalls have been associated with the prevalence of conflict (Collier and Hofler 2002) and rent seeking behavior. (Bates 1983 , Sklar 1991 According to the prevailing wisdom, the concentration of fiscal resources tends to encourage excessive and imprudent investment, while oil revenue distribution through protection of favored activities or firms creates high deadweight costs and encourages corruption. (Gelb 1988 , Auty 1998 , Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth 2003 to undermine the effectiveness of institutions designed to limit discretionary behavior in resource revenue management. Substantial new research is warranted -particularly by Africa's international development partners -into how governments in Africa (such as Botswana and more recently Nigeria) have dealt successfully with these pressures with a view to promoting the more widespread adoption of good practices.
Support for these changes must also come from industrialized nations.
Multinational companies, with the active encouragement of their home governments, need to recognize the need for transparency in accounting for revenue, royalty and production sharing payments. Voluntary codes of conduct can also encompass investing in communities, and recognizing the necessity for community participation in mitigating environmental degradation, social disruption, and workplace hazards. Government and industry can also work together, not only to protect local communities from the harmful effects of extractive projects, but also to make sure that these communities are among the very first to benefit from projects that lead to increased natural resource revenue.
Creating an Export Push in Agriculture
The vast majority of Africa's poor live in rural areas and derive their incomes from agriculture. Thus, poverty levels tend to be highly responsive to agricultural growth. In Uganda for example between 1992 and 2003 agricultural growth accounted for over 50 percent of the reduction in head count poverty (Okidi et. al., 2005) . In Ghana between 1991/92 and 1998/99 growth in agricultural incomes resulted in about 44 percent of the reduction in poverty (Aryeetey and McKay, 2004 ). Yet agricultural productivity in Africa lags that of other developing regions both in terms of output per unit of land and output per unit of labor (Byerlee and Jackson, 2005) .
Limited technology for arid agriculture, low access to existing technology -often as a consequence of poor extension systems -and declining investments in rural infrastructure all combine to limit productivity change in African agriculture (World Bank, 2005) . Ghana for example allocated only 2.5 percent of its total budget to agriculture and Uganda only 1.5 percent, contrasted with Bangladesh where more than 12 percent of the budget was directed toward agriculture. Failure to resolve land tenure issues and to clearly define the boundaries between public and private roles in such areas as credit, input supply, and marketing also constrain private investments.
Redressing the imbalance in policy attention and public expenditures toward agriculture is likely to require the development of an "agricultural lobby" in many African economies. Such a lobby can emerge from the most rapidly growing segment of African agriculture, the export sector.
As Asian economies grow, especially those of China and India, there is strong potential for increased agricultural exports to Asia in a range of products for which demand rises as incomes rise. 20 The 1990s saw a steady increase in food exports to Asia from sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 9 ). Europe and North America also represent important market opportunities in such non-traditional agricultural exports as horticultural crops, cut flowers, and processed agricultural products. Kenya's success in flower and horticulture exports, has generated over 100,000 jobs. There have also been major export expansions in Senegalese vegetables, roses from Ethiopia and shrimp from Madagascar.
Growth of export agriculture in Africa has had both a direct and indirect poverty impacts. In Ghana and Uganda, poverty headcounts among those engaged in export agriculture declined significantly during the 1990's, even though rural poverty and poverty among those engaged in food crop agriculture increased during the same time period (Table 2) . Increased agricultural exports also had positive spillover effects. As export crops expanded, there were concurrent productivity gains in food-crops. This was apparently the result of increases in the number of providers and improvements in the quality of inputs and services, and of infrastructure improvements. These improvements in rural infrastructure and services while targeted at the export sector, also helped other farmers who made use of the same roads, inputs, and services.
Non-traditional exports including flowers, horticultural crops and processed foods may also offer benefits to the economy at large. Non-traditional exports, including penetrate external markets, how the handle the complex logistics of international trade, and how to master new technologies, lessons which may be used and adapted to other lines of economic activity and which can help to raise productivity. Chile's fresh fruit production for example involves high levels of technology application, with valuable knowledge generation and important spillover effects for the rest of the economy (de Ferranti et. al., 2001 ).
Pushing agricultural exports will require a renewed focus on the key constraints affecting Africa's rural economy. Access to markets and inputs is crucial. Africa has 7 km of navigable roads per 100 square kilometers of land -compared to 170 kilometers in Europe. In Burkina Faso and Zambia the road density is 5-7 percent that of India in 1999. Because of poor market access more than three-fourths of African farmers are isolated from national and world markets (Table 3) . Kelly and Byerlee (2004) estimate that 60 percent of the rural population in Africa lives in areas of good agricultural potential but poor market access. The consequences of high transport costs and limited infrastructure are particularly severe for exporters. Due primarily to high transport margins African coffee producers receive a farm gate price that is 30 percent below the price received by Vietnamese producers (Diao, et. al., 2005) .
Resolving land tenure issues equitably will also be important in many countries.
Clarity of ownership and tenure can significantly affect levels of investment in agriculture, and facilitate innovation. Land issues present themselves in a variety of way across the continent, requiring custom made institutional reforms. In Uganda for example the Land Act of 1988 has yet to be fully implemented, due to the cost and complexity of its procedures, but it has made traditional methods of resolving tenure disputes illegal. Thus, tenants (importantly including women) protected under the law remain without secure tenure and access to collateral (Okidi, et al., 2005) . In Ghana difficulties facing non-community members in gaining access to land, constrain commercial farming (Aryeteey and McKay, 2004) .
The global system must also open up. African farmers now face a trading system that is in many ways stacked against them. West Africans face damaging cotton subsidies, estimated to cost $250 million a year. Cascading tariffs that penalize agricultural producers when they process or add value are harmful throughout the continent ( Figure 10 ). In Asia, tariffs for cocoa powder, for example, are nearly four times those for cocoa beans. Those for vegetable oil in contrast to oil seeds carry an even larger penalty. The need to level the playing field globally, and build an international environment that supports development, including in agriculture requires that the industrialized nations (including the rapidly industrializing countries in Asia) assign high priority to successful completion of the Doha Round.
Strengthening Sub-regional integration. 
VII. Conclusions
This paper began by asking whether the debate on pro-poor growth in Africa made sense from a public policy point of view. In the 1990s, donors and development practitioners widely shared the view that growth alone was insufficient to ensure acceptable increases in the incomes and capabilities of poor people, and as African governments designed their first generation of poverty reduction strategies, they tended to pay greater attention to allocating public expenditures toward delivering services to identified groups of the poor than to the public actions needed to spur growth. This formulation was at the heart of the Poverty Reduction Strategy approach adopted by the World Bank and the IMF in 1999 and subsequently adapted to a wider "development architecture" in the Monterrey Consensus emanating from the UN Financing for Development Conference in 2002. simple fact, however, was that African economies were not growing, making sustained poverty reduction impossible.
Drawing on the experience of a number of successful East Asian countries, this paper advocates creating shared growth strategies in Africa. These shared growth strategies differ from "pro-poor growth" as it has normally been conceived by the development community, in that they do not take the growth of income of the poor as the primary objective of public policy. Rather, they combine a focus on growth -using all of the public policy means available to create and sustain growth -with specific actions -in education, health, rural development, and micro and small enterprise development for example -designed to equip the poor to participate in and benefit from growth. In this way they recognize explicitly that the pursuit of growth without pro-poor policies may risk bypassing the poor, but equally that a myopic focus on pro-poor policies, may risk diverting attention from growth. The link between growth and poverty reduction in a shared growth strategy is both direct -as rising household incomes draw some of the poor out of poverty --and indirect -as rising fiscal revenues linked to growth permit improvements in the volume and quality of the public investments directed at bringing the poor into the economic mainstream.
The three areas of public policy outlined in the paper -managing natural resource revenues, pushing agricultural exports, and deepening regional integration -illustrate some of the means by which shared growth strategies might be pursued in Africa. In the case of mineral exporters the state has the opportunity to make both pro-growth and propoor investments, if it can manage the political and institutional complexities of good fiscal management in a resource rich economy. Agricultural exports have the capacity to serve as both a driver of growth in their own right, possibly with important spillovers to the rest of the economy, and as a means to create a "rural lobby" for the investments and institutional changes that can lead to more broadly based agricultural growth with its attendant strong impact on poverty reduction. Effective regional integration is essential if Africa's land locked economies are to deepen their links to the global economy, moving the shared growth agenda to the pan-African plane. Cord, Lopez, and Page (2003) . World Bank (1992, 1999, 1993b, 2003) 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 Per 1970-1975 1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 Per Capita Income of Lowest Quintile
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